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I. Introduction
Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 19971
(“ASFA”) in response to growing concerns that state agencies were keeping
2
children in foster care for too long and returning them to unsafe homes.
ASFA clarified, among other issues, that family reunification after a child's
removal is favored. To effectuate reunification, ASFA requires child
protective service agencies to make reasonable efforts by providing services
such as parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, or therapy for the
family.3 However, ASFA also requires courts to consider the safety of the
child as the paramount concern in all child welfare cases.4 As a result,
under ASFA, reasonable efforts may not be required if there are
“aggravated circumstances,” such as the parent subjecting the child to
1. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
2. Katherine S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA, 29
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 239 (2009) (citing The Adoption Promotion Act of 1997:
Hearing on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 105th Cong. 48, 48-49 (1997).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2010) (clarifying the Reasonable Efforts Requirement:
“[R]easonable efforts shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a
court of competent jurisdiction has determined that –
(i) the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in
State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse);
(ii) the parent has – (I) committed murder . . . of another child of the parent; (II)
committed voluntary manslaughter . . . of another child of the parent; (III) aided
or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or (ii)
such a voluntary manslaughter; (IV) committed a felony assault that results in
serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent; or
(iii) the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated
involuntarily.”).
4. Id.
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abandonment, torture, unexplained serious injuries, chronic abuse, or sexual
abuse.5 States generally interpret this provision to mean that where there
6
are aggravating circumstances, child protective service agencies may be
excused from providing reunification services, but may also choose to make
services available even when they are not required.7 Significantly, excusing
the child protective services agency from providing reunification services to
parents is often a substantial step toward terminating parental rights.8
The discretion to deny reunification services has often led to
9
inconsistencies in how and when courts order such services for parents.
Historically, cases of unexplained child abuse and neglect involving two
parent caregivers have been extremely difficult to prosecute in both civil
and criminal courts. Because the child welfare system cannot always rely
on the criminal justice system to protect children, it must rely on civil
statutes to protect and address the needs of abused children and their
families; however, current child welfare protections often do not extend far
enough in cases where there are two caregivers with no plausible
explanation for a child’s serious injury.
This Article addresses how Delaware has adopted ASFA’s aggravated
circumstances provisions, both statutorily and as applied by the Delaware
Family Court. Delaware, like many other states, grapples with unexplained,
serious child injuries. This Article will also address specific cases in
Delaware that rose and fell on the basis of aggravated circumstances. This
Article places Delaware in the national context of statutory and judicial
approaches to aggravated circumstances by suggesting a legislative path
forward to provide even greater protections to children in the state.
Part II of this Article will review two recent cases in Delaware and
provide the historical context for aggravated circumstances in that state.
Part III reviews the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) guidelines for
child protection systems’ responsibilities as they relate to cases involving
serious injuries. Part IV reviews how the fifty states have responded
5. Id.
6. The federal statute uses the term “aggravated circumstances,” but states have
variously adopted “aggravated” or “aggravating” circumstances in their statutes. The
alternate usage of “aggravated” or “aggravating” throughout this article mirrors those
differences.
7. Bean, supra note 2, at 251.
8. See, e.g., In re Jac’Quez N., 669 N.W.2d 429, 437 (Neb. 2003) (holding that clear
and convincing evidence supported a finding that the mother subjected the child to
aggravating circumstances, and thus reasonable efforts at reunification were not required).
9. We recognize inconsistencies will naturally exist because of factual differences,
case complexity, and judicial discretion.

320

19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 317 (2013)

statutorily to ASFA’s aggravated circumstances clause. Part V will address
how various jurisdictions handle serious injury cases. Finally, Part VI will
propose strengthened protections in aggravated circumstance cases
specifically to address the problem of children with unexplained injuries
involving two parent caregivers.
II. Delaware
A. Recent Cases
In Delaware, dependency and neglect cases involving two parent
caregivers and a child with serious injuries may be problematic when those
parent caregivers10 act as a united front to protect each other and the
evidence cannot pinpoint who perpetrated the life-threatening injuries upon
the child. Two recent serious injury cases are emblematic of the inherent
complexity in Delaware’s current child welfare system. This complexity
manifests when two parent caregivers either present a united front of denial
or are both the potential perpetrators of abuse.
The first case involves baby Matt,11 who came into the foster care
system at five months old with serious inflicted12 injuries.13 Matt was
admitted to the emergency room with skull fractures, bruising on his leg, a
bruised ear, and multiple fractures all over his body in various stages of
healing. The multiple injuries signified at least two, if not more, incidents
of inflicted abuse.14
Matt’s mother and stepfather were his primary caregivers. The
maternal grandmother occasionally cared for him as well. Both the mother
and the stepfather were interviewed by the police and criminally
investigated, but neither explained what, or who, caused the injuries. The
10. The term “caregiver” refers to parents or others who live with the child and are
actively caring for the child.
11. The child has been given a pseudonym to protect his identity.
12. “Inflicted injuries” is used to describe injuries that were caused by an actor, though
that actor may not be identified. “Inflicted” is used rather than “non-accidental” because
injuries could, theoretically, be both inflicted and accidental. The determination of whether
injuries are accidental or non-accidental has legal consequences. Therefore, at the initial
stages of a case, it may be more appropriate to refer to injuries caused by an unknown
human actor as “inflicted.” “Inflicted injury” is also a medical opinion.
13. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., Del Fam. Ct., FN:12-02-10T (Jan. 8, 2013)
(describing Matt’s injuries).
14. Id.
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mother admitted that Matt suffered severe injuries while in her care, but did
not explain or identify the source of those injuries.15 Nearly a year and a
half after Matt came into foster care, the mother pled guilty to misdemeanor
offensive touching stemming from some of Matt’s injuries, with a sentence
of suspended Level V for 30 days and an order to enroll in an anger
management program.16
Although the Division of Family Services (“DFS”) requested to be
excused from case planning on the grounds of serious unexplained injury,17
the court felt legally bound to require DFS to case plan with the mother.18
Under Delaware’s termination of parental rights serious injury statute, the
court could not determine that Matt’s injuries “resulted from” the mother’s
intentional conduct, reckless disregard, or willful neglect and therefore DFS
was required to case plan with the mother.19 The court determined that her
failure to seek medical attention did not rise to the statutory ground for
aggravated circumstances.20 The stepfather was not a party to the civil
action because he had no legal ties to the child. Matt’s mother’s rights were
eventually terminated for failure to plan.21 The natural father ultimately
voluntarily consented to a termination. Despite efforts by DFS to provide
reunification services to the mother, she did not participate in any case
planning and had no contact with Matt after he entered foster care.22
Baby Jill23 was also five months old when she entered foster care after
enduring twenty-seven fractures all over her body, including a broken
clavicle and injuries to her extremities caused by yanking, squeezing, and
shaking.24 Prior to entering care, Jill’s mother called the pediatrician to
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103(a)(8) (2009). DFS is excused from making reasonable
efforts at reunification where “[a] child has suffered unexplained serious physical injury,
near death, or death under such circumstances as would indicate that such injuries, near
death or death resulted from the intentional or reckless conduct or wilful [sic] neglect of the
parent.”
18. Matt’s mother did not complete any element on her case plan and never visited
with Matt after his entry into the foster care system.
19. Div. of Family Servs v. A.A., 11-22215 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 10, 2011). It is
important to note that there were other complicating factors in this case, which led the Court
to order DFS to case plan with the mother.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The child has been given a pseudonym to protect her identity.
24. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., No. 11–08–09TN, 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam.
Ct. 2012), aff’d Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 2012 WL 6525082 (Del. 2013, decided Dec.
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report clicking and popping sounds in Jill’s chest when she breathed. Jill’s
mother had heard these clicking and popping sounds for about a week
before her initial call to Jill’s pediatrician. The pediatrician sent Jill to the
hospital for suspected fractures and ordered x-rays. Jill was sent home
shortly thereafter. Jill’s mother returned to the hospital the next morning
because the clicking and popping sounds had not abated while awaiting the
x-ray results.25 A pediatric child abuse expert examined Jill and determined
that the injuries were in various stages of healing: some of the fractures had
occurred within the previous five days and others were at least two to three
weeks old.26
Jill's mother and father were her primary caregivers.27 Neither parent
reported any accidents or events that might have caused the clicking and
popping sounds to occur.28 Neither parent provided a plausible explanation
as to the cause of the injuries at any point during the criminal investigation
or the dependency proceedings.29 Both parents admitted they were her
primary caregivers and that only one other individual watched Jill alone for
a few hours at least six weeks prior to Jill’s hospital admission, which did
not align with the dates or ages of her injuries.30 Additionally, the father
had a previous criminal charge of third-degree assault for abusing another
of his children ten years prior when the child was three months old. Not
surprisingly, Jill did not incur any additional fractures after she was
removed from her parents’ custody and placed in a foster home.31
Unlike its decision in Matt’s case, soon after Jill came into foster care,
the Family Court determined that the DFS decision to forgo case planning
was neither arbitrary nor capricious.32 In a subsequent proceeding, the
court terminated parental rights on the grounds of unexplained serious
injury.33 Although the parents appealed, the Delaware Supreme Court
13, 2012).
25. A Delaware Child Abuse Neglect Panel reviewed pursuant to the Child Death,
Near Death and Still Birth Commission. DEL. CODE tit. 31, § 302 (2011).
26. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., No.11–08–09TN, 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. Ct.
May 23, 2012).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., No.11–08–09TN, 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. Ct.
May 23, 2012).
32. Id.
33. Long v. Div. of Family Servs., No. 341 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2012), appeal docketed,
No. 341, 2012 (Del. 2012).

DISMANTLING THE UNITED FRONT

323

affirmed the decision.34 Still, without conclusive evidence, neither Jill’s
mother nor father has been arrested or charged with abuse or neglect.
Even before Matt and Jill’s cases, Delaware had a variable history of
serious child injury cases, which shaped the Family Court’s consideration
of such cases. Before Delaware codified ASFA’s aggravated circumstances
into its termination of parental rights statute, the Division of Family
Services first sought permission to be excused from exerting reasonable
efforts in 1999, involving a case where a child with a history of abuse came
into state custody for a second time with bruises, a skull fracture, and
subdural hematomas, which were likely the result of violent shaking.35
Because of these grave injuries, the court excused DFS from case planning
with the mother when she provided no plausible explanation. The court
concluded that the child’s health and safety would be placed in jeopardy if
she were to return home.36 It further determined that “either Mother
inflicted the abuse; Mother and someone else inflicted the abuse; or Mother
knowingly failed to protect her child by allowing someone else to inflict
abuse onto the child.”37 In 1997, 2000, and 2001, Delaware codified the
federal ASFA requirements within its termination of parental rights statute
and expanded aggravated circumstances to include abandonment, felony
convictions where the victim is a child, prior involuntary terminations,
torture, and chronic, life threatening and near death child abuse cases.38
Since that time, when aggravated circumstances exist in a case, the
Delaware Family Court proceedings have resulted in divergent outcomes.
In a 2002 case, DFS case planned with the parents of a seven week-old
child who came into care for significant, unexplained injuries while the
father was the primary caregiver. The parents had a significant history of
domestic violence and substance abuse. The court ultimately terminated
the father’s parental rights because the father pled guilty to felony
endangering the welfare of a child, and for unexplained injuries that
resulted from the father’s intentional conduct or willful neglect. Although
the court terminated mother’s parental rights on failure to plan grounds, the
court was unable to conclude that a finding of unexplained serious physical
34. Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 2012 WL 6525082 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2012).
35. Div. of Family Servs v. J.K., 1999 WL 33208262 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1999) (holding
that due to the mother’s minimal steps to protect the child and the mother’s disinterest in the
child’s welfare, DFS did not have to undertake reasonable efforts before commencing
termination proceedings with the mother).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5.
38. 73 Del. Laws 171 (2001).
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injury resulted from mother’s intentional conduct or willful neglect because
the mother was unaware of the father’s state of mind the night that the child
sustained life threatening injuries.39
In 2004, the Family Court found termination grounds as to both a
mother and father for unexplained physical injuries when an infant
miraculously survived after being thrown into a marsh. In that case, the
mother left her infant with the child’s father, who twenty-four hours prior
had beaten and raped her. The court was satisfied that grounds to terminate
mother’s parental rights existed because, notwithstanding mother’s
knowledge of the father’s violent behavior, she still left the infant in his
care.40
Yet, in 2006, the court declined to terminate the parental rights of a
mother after her child entered foster care for severe unexplained injuries
while in the father’s care. DFS sought a finding of aggravated
circumstances because the mother delayed seeking medical treatment for
the child. However, the court held that it could not conclusively find that
the mother caused any of the child’s injuries, and that since the mother did
not unreasonably delay in seeking medical treatment, her parental rights
could not be terminated.41
Then, in 2009, the court determined that aggravated circumstances
were present when an infant came into care with serious, unexplained
injuries from at least two incidents of abuse resulting in skull fractures.
Although the parents were not criminally charged for their child’s injuries,
the court conclusively determined that aggravated circumstances existed
because the parents were the child’s primary caregivers and neither had an
explanation as to how the child sustained such severe injuries.42 In that
case, the child transitioned to a permanent guardianship arrangement with
relatives.
Many of the cases highlighted above, including Matt and Jill’s cases,
demonstrate that not all incidents of child abuse are criminally prosecuted
to the fullest extent possible because there often is a nonverbal child or

39. Div. of Family Servs. v. L.M., No. 01-06-09TN, 2002 WL 32101227, at 1, 11
(Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 10, 2002).
40. In re of J.G.W. III., No. 03-12-1TK, 2004 WL 3245804, at 1, 6 (Del. Fam. Ct.
Nov. 10, 2004).
41. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.B., No. 04-10-03TN, 2006 WL 1389860, at 1, 17 (Del.
Fam. Ct. Jan. 4, 2006).
42. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.W, No. CK08-01363 & CK08-01639, Nicholas, J. (Del.
Fam. Ct. June 19, 2009).
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insufficient evidence to implicate a perpetrator.43 As such, Delaware’s
termination of parental rights statute has been amended to ensure the safety
of children when parent caregivers cannot be criminally convicted of child
abuse.
“[I]n the American system of criminal justice, the offender is not
always identified in a manner permitting a criminal prosecution. In
order to ensure that children are protected even when their abusers
cannot be held criminally liable, Del. Code Tit. 13, section 1103 (a)(8)
allows termination of parental rights of parents whose children sustain
serious physical injuries “under such circumstances as would indicate
that such injuries . . . resulted from the intentional or reckless conduct
or willful neglect of the parent.”44
Yet, in many serious child injury cases, the two parent caregivers
prioritize their relationship over the child’s safety.45 One parent may inflict
serious physical abuse while the other, either unwilling or unable to protect
the child, stands by and continues to protect the abusive parent, or both
parents jointly perpetrate the abuse.46 Instead of acting in the child’s best
interest, which would include identifying the perpetrator to protect the child
from future harm, two parent caregivers may present a united front of
ignorance or denial regarding how a child sustains serious injuries.47
Consequently, the child or children at issue in such cases may never truly
be safe without either an acknowledgement of abuse by the caregivers or a
corrective safety plan to protect the child because there is no way to remedy
a grave danger to a child when no explanation exists as to what, or whom,
that danger is.48
The Delaware Family Court, like similar courts in other states, may
struggle with such blanket denials by parents who assert a Fifth
43. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Working with the Courts in Child
Protection 41 (2006), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals /courts/courts.pdf.
44. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2012), aff’d,
Long v. DFS, 2012 WL 6525082 (Del. 2013).
45. Numerous reasons exist as to why parents may prioritize their relationship over the
child’s safety, including intimate partner violence, substance abuse, mental health or
developmental disabilities. See generally Diane J. English, The Extent and Consequences of
Child Maltreatment, in 8 PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (1998).
46. See infra notes 204–205 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Child Protection Inc., Oregon Safety Threats Guide, app. 2.4,
http://www.dhs.state.or.us/caf/safety_model/procedure_manual/appendices/ch2-app/2-4.pdf.
48. Action for Child Protection, Inc., Unexplained Injuries, http://www.actionchild
protection.org/ documents/2003/pdf/May2003UnexplainedInjuries2-27.pdf (May 2003) (on
file with author).
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Amendment right in conjunction with a pending, or anticipated, criminal
trial related to their child’s injuries. When parents fail to discuss or disclose
their role in the abuse, it interferes with case planning for reunification, and
parents may not be able to assert a Fifth Amendment right sufficient to
trump their child’s best interests in a speedy and appropriate placement.49
Nonetheless, where the circumstances compelling disclosure constitute a
penalty situation, parents can prevail on their Fifth Amendment rights.50
Courts can avoid reversal on Fifth Amendment grounds by structuring their
opinions to reflect that the parent’s failure to disclose impeded the therapy
or other services offered to the parent under their reunification plan, as
without successful completion, there can be no reunification and
termination is warranted.51 This fine line, however, as well as uncertainty
as to the status of related criminal charges, may force courts to label certain
injuries as “unexplained” when parents, invoking the Fifth Amendment,
refuse to discuss what happened.52 As such, it should be kept in mind that
“unexplained” may be more of a legal conclusion that no one perpetrator
has been identified, rather than an accurate portrayal of the uncertainty of
49. In re A.C., 97 P.3d 960, 968 (Mont. 2001). See also In re P.M.C., 902 N.E.2d 197,
203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (finding a fine but important distinction between terminating
parental rights on refusal to admit to crime, and terminating parental rights based upon
failure to comply with an order to undergo meaningful therapy where refusal to admit
precludes rehabilitation); Robert S. v. Arizona Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., No. CA-JV-2010-0063,
2010 WL 4296659, at 1-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2010) (affirming father’s termination of
parental rights after he refused to participate in treatment under the assumption that he was a
sex offender and finding no Fifth Amendment violation).
50. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 494, 496 (1967) (prohibiting courts from
penalizing parties who choose not to testify or otherwise incriminate themselves). See also
State v. Brown, 182 P.3d 1205, 1212-14 (Kan. 2008) (holding that where a parent is
compelled to admit to criminal acts or face the loss of parental rights, the incriminating
statement will be excluded from evidence once the parent becomes a defendant in a criminal
proceeding); In re D.P., 763 N.E.2d 351, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that forcing a
parent to choose between losing parental rights and waiving right to self-incrimination is
unconstitutional).
51. People ex rel. E.W., 780 P.2d 32, 33 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
52. Some courts resolve this problem by granting parents immunity for the statements.
See, e.g., id. at 33 (holding that once father had been granted immunity and still failed to
comply with his treatment plan, his Fifth Amendment privilege did not prevent termination
of parental rights). Cf. In re Gladys H., 235 A.D.2d 841, 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (finding
no error in placing father in dilemma of either testifying about the sexual abuse of his
daughters and possibly facing later criminal charges or remaining silent in family court and
risk that his parental rights be terminated); In re Samantha C., 847 A.3d 883, 907-08 (Conn.
2004) (establishing based on the civil, remedial nature of the proceeding and the best
interests of the child standard that the legislature did not intend to insulate parents from
inferences drawn from their failure to testify at termination proceedings).
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causation. Because the criminal system does not always produce criminal
charges or convictions for child abuse and neglect, the civil system often
provides a more effective framework for ensuring the safety of children like
Matt and Jill. However, not all jurisdictions are equally equipped with the
statutory tools to provide permanency expeditiously for children who
cannot be reunited with their parents because of “unexplained” serious
physical injuries.
III. State Adoption of Federal Guidelines
Under ASFA, each state is free to define “aggravated
circumstances.”53 ASFA suggests that aggravated circumstance may
include, but need not be limited to: abandonment, torture, chronic abuse,
and sexual abuse.54 Where there are aggravated circumstances, reasonable
efforts toward reunification are not required.55
A. Aggravated Circumstances
There is little consensus among states when incorporating “aggravated
circumstances” into their reasonable efforts calculus. Eleven states use
“aggravated circumstances” as an umbrella under which they enumerate all
the circumstances where reasonable efforts are not required. Ten states
include the ASFA definition of aggravated circumstances, with its core four
situations—abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse—
without further elaboration. Four states include the core four situations as
circumstances that excuse reasonable efforts, but do not use the term
“aggravated circumstances.” Six states use the term “aggravated
circumstances” but define the term vaguely or not at all. Nine states
incorporate “aggravated circumstances” into their statutes by including the
core four situations and elaborating on other types of cases that are
considered aggravated. Finally, ten states neither use the term “aggravated
circumstances” nor include a recognizable enumeration of the ASFA core
four situations in their statutes.56
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2010) (allowing the states to define aggravating
circumstances as they see fit).
54. See id. (listing possible scenarios resulting in aggravated circumstances).
55. See id. (stating reasonable efforts towards reunification are not required when
aggravating circumstances are present).
56. See supra notes 43–48.
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Jurisprudence regarding aggravated circumstances also varies widely.
Many states’ courts interpret ASFA such that even when reunification
efforts are not required, they still may be permitted. Rather than barring
services, an aggravated circumstance instead excuses the requirement that
services be provided and renders the decision discretionary. Just over half
of the states have no appellate-level jurisprudence specifically defining or
elaborating upon what constitutes aggravated circumstances, especially in
serious injury cases. Of the remaining twenty-three states, only six have
significant jurisprudence on serious bodily injury and aggravated
circumstances. New Jersey has a judicial methodology for determining
whether there are aggravating circumstances, and if so, whether to provide
services.57
Nebraska has a contextual definition of aggravated
circumstances, determined on a case-by-case basis.58 Michigan defines a
cluster of circumstances, not listed in the statute, that provide a basis for
finding aggravated circumstances.59 Arkansas defines both specific
instances where aggravated circumstances can be found and a general
character of aggravated circumstances.60 Oregon focuses on the elements
of indirect causation that can still lead to a finding of aggravated
circumstances.61 New York uses a community standard of heinousness to
judge which cases are aggravated.62
Currently, Delaware permits its Division of Family Services to be
excused from case planning on the grounds of abandonment; certain felony
offenses; prior involuntary termination; where a parent has subjected a child
to torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, and/or life-threatening abuse; and
where a child has suffered unexplained serious physical injury, near death
or death under such circumstances as would indicate that such injuries, near
death or death resulted from the intentional or reckless conduct or “wilful”
[sic] neglect of the parent.63 However, Delaware has several opportunities
to strengthen DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103(a)(7)-(8) to further children’s best
interests in cases where they have been seriously injured or subjected to
aggravated circumstances while in the care of two parent caregivers acting
as a united front. First, Delaware can amend the causation elements for
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103 (a)(2), (4), (6)–(8) (2009).
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these termination grounds to streamline cases involving acts or omissions
by two parent caregivers steadfast in their united front of denial or
ignorance by defining the term “subjected to.” Second, Delaware can
explicitly include “chronic neglect” as an excusing condition under the
termination of parental rights statute. Third, Delaware can simplify its
current termination of parental rights statute to incorporate all aggravated
circumstances under one statutory ground.
B. Reasonable Efforts
The term “reasonable efforts” refers to state social services agencies
helping families to remain intact or reunify.64 While such services and their
providers differ by state, these efforts may include family therapy,
parenting classes, addiction treatment, respite care, and in-home services.65
In addition to “aggravated circumstances,” ASFA provides that reasonable
efforts are not required when a parent murders, commits voluntary
manslaughter, aids, abets, attempts, conspires, or solicits such murder or
manslaughter, or commits a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury
to the child or another child of the parent, or the parent’s rights to a child’s
sibling have been involuntarily terminated.66 Some states have additional
statutory grounds excusing social services from making reasonable
preservation or reunification efforts, such as a parent’s refusal or failure in
treatment for chronic alcohol or drug abuse or failure to comply with the
terms of a reunification plan.67 When reasonable efforts are required, the
social service agency’s attempts to reunify may last upwards of fifteen
months. However, once the social service agency is absolved of making
reasonable efforts to reunify a family in cases of serious injury or
aggravated circumstances, the case may proceed in an expedited fashion to

64. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify
Families and Achieve Permanency for Children: Summary of State Laws (Oct. 2012),
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/reunify.cfm.
65. Id. at 1–2.
66. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (West 2010) (describing when reasonable efforts are not
required under the ASFA).
67. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 65, at 3–4. Alabama,
California, Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Puerto Rico list
chronic abuse and refusal or failed treatment as excusing grounds. Alaska, Florida, Kansas,
Maine, Utah, Washington, and Puerto Rico consider failure to comply with a reunification
plan’s terms as excusing grounds.
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provide permanency for the child, including terminating parental rights to
free the child for adoption.68
IV. State Statutes on Aggravated Circumstances
Just as states have different kinds and numbers of additional excusing
grounds, states also define “aggravated circumstances” differently. Georgia
uses the exact language of ASFA without elaboration, and most states
include some version of the federal provision’s examples.69 Aggravated
circumstances, textually or substantively, appear in state statutes excusing
reasonable efforts in the following six ways: (1) as an umbrella
encompassing all grounds for no reasonable efforts;70 (2) as one ground
without definition beyond the four examples in ASFA;71 (3) as one ground
mirroring ASFA but not expressly using the term “aggravated
circumstances;”72 (4) as an undefined or vague term;73 (5) as an expansion
on the ASFA core four of abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual
abuse;74 and (6) not at all.75

68. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(E) (“[I]f
reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph (B) are not made with respect to a
child as a result of a determination made by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance
with subparagraph (D) – (i) a permanency hearing . . . which considers in-State and out-ofState placement options for the child, shall be held within 30 days after the determination;
and (ii) reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance
with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessarily to finalize the
permanent placement of the child; and (F) reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or
with a legal guardian, including identifying appropriate in-State and out-of-State placements
may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph
(B) . . . .”).
69. See Bean, supra note 2, at 229 (listing the states that include some portion of the
ASFA in their respective statutes).
70. Eleven states: Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
71. Ten states: Georgia, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
72. Four states and the District of Columbia: Alaska, Delaware, Maryland, and South
Dakota.
73. Six states: Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, New York, and Oklahoma.
74. Nine states: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming.
75. Ten states: California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, Ohio, and Utah.
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A. The Umbrella
Several states structure their statutes so that all grounds excusing
reasonable efforts are included under the umbrella of “aggravated
circumstances.” In such cases, the other ASFA provisions excusing
reasonable efforts, such as parents’ murder convictions where the victim
was one of their children, are included as well. This statutory structure is
technically duplicative, since ASFA already provides that such
circumstances are grounds to excuse reunification efforts. For example,
Vermont defines aggravated circumstances to include situations where the
parent has subjected a child to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or
sexual abuse; has been convicted of murder or manslaughter of a child; has
been convicted of a felony crime that results in serious bodily injury to the
child or another child of the parent; and the parental rights with respect to a
sibling have been terminated.76 Idaho’s statute is similarly duplicative;
however, aggravated circumstances are not limited to those enumerated and
serious bodily injury to a child is also included.77
Other states include grounds not mentioned in ASFA under
“aggravated circumstances.” Hawaii requires no service plan if the court
finds that there are aggravated circumstances, which are then defined to
include six circumstances, none of which exactly mirror ASFA’s core
four.78 Iowa similarly includes all grounds for waiving reasonable efforts
under the umbrella of aggravated circumstances.79 Pennsylvania uses
76. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5102 (West 2010).
77. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16–1619(6)(d) (West 2010) (stating that aggravated
circumstances include, but are not limited to: abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual
abuse; the parent committed murder or voluntary manslaughter or aided, abetted, attempted,
conspired, or solicited such crimes against another child; the parent committed a battery
resulting in serious bodily injury to the child; and prior involuntary termination of parental
rights to a sibling.
78. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 587A–2, 587A–71 (West 2012). Two of the six
circumstances include child torture and infant abandonment. Three are grounds separate
from aggravated circumstances, but also found in ASFA, including murder or voluntary
manslaughter of another child of the parent, felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury
to the child or another child of the parent, and previous judicial termination of parental rights
to the child’s sibling. The sixth circumstance is a prior court determination as to a sibling
that “the parent is not willing and able to provide a safe family home.”
79. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.102 (West 2012). Two of the five are akin to ASFA – the
parent has abandoned the child or the court finds physical or sexual abuse or neglect. Two
mirror the other ASFA grounds, including murder or voluntary manslaughter and felony
assault. The fifth is conjunctive and requires both a prior termination of parental rights as
well as clear and convincing evidence that services are unlikely within a reasonable time to
correct the conditions leading to the child’s removal from the home.

332

19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 317 (2013)

aggravated circumstances as one part of a two-part conjunctive
determination: there must be both aggravated circumstances and no new or
additional efforts are required.80 Pennsylvania’s grounds include the ASFA
list of crimes, prior involuntary termination, abandonment, and that the
child or another child of the parent “has been the victim of serious physical
abuse, sexual violence, or aggravated physical neglect by the parent.”81
State statutes using the umbrella structure do not always mirror ASFA.
Washington uses the umbrella structure more restrictively: four of the seven
provisions require criminal convictions for violent or sexual offenses, while
the other three are abandonment of an infant less than three years old, a
finding by a court that a parent is a sexually violent predator, and failure to
complete a treatment plan resulting in a prior parental rights termination
with no significant changes in the interim.82 By contrast, Texas uses the
umbrella structure, but its description of “aggravated circumstances” is
quite expansive.83 Texas includes two forms of abandonment, serious
bodily injury or sexual abuse, both commission or conviction of murder or
manslaughter, a variety of sex crimes and child pornography offenses, a
prior termination of parental rights with a finding of child endangerment,
prior termination of parental rights to two other children (without any
stipulation of a certain finding), and felony assault.84 Arizona similarly
uses “aggravated circumstances” as an umbrella, but deviates from ASFA
both in structure and content.85
Other states use aggravated circumstances as an umbrella for most, but
not all, of the circumstances excusing reasonable efforts. Maine does not
require reunification efforts where there is an aggravating factor or where
80. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6351, 6302 (West 2012).
81. Id.
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.132 (West 2012).
83. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.2015 (West 2011).
84. Id.
85. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8–846 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances, which
must be found by clear and convincing evidence, exist where: the parent cannot be identified
or located, or suffers from a mental illness that will likely prevent him or her from resuming
the child’s care within twelve months; the parent has a prior termination of parental rights
and the conditions leading to the termination were not remedied; parent was convicted of
murder, manslaughter, sexual abuse, sexual assault, molestation, or sexual exploitation of a
child, or aiding or abetting such crimes; the child was previously adjudicated dependent due
to physical or sexual abuse, returned to the parent, and then removed within eighteen months
due to additional physical or sexual abuse; the child has suffered severe physical or
emotional injury by the parent or a person known to the parent; or the child was removed
from the parent on at least two previous occasions, reunification services were offered or
provided, and the parent is unable to discharge parental duties.
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continuing reunification efforts is inconsistent with the child’s permanency
plan, and either condition is sufficient by itself to excuse reasonable
efforts.86 Under the Maine framework, aggravated circumstances are then
used as an umbrella for five separate circumstances regarding the parent,
including the ASFA provisions, failure to plan, and subjecting a child to
“any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.”87 New
Mexico uses a similar disjunctive structure, not requiring reasonable efforts
where “[t]he efforts would be futile” or where there are aggravated
circumstances, and then continuing to define aggravated circumstances in
keeping with ASFA.88 North Dakota also uses a disjunctive structure, but
the two independently sufficient excusing prongs are aggravated
circumstances and prior involuntary termination of parental rights.89 North
Dakota’s statute is more similar to the other umbrella statutes in Hawaii,
Iowa, and Pennsylvania than it is to the disjunctive statutes in Maine or
New Mexico. North Dakota also defines aggravated circumstances quite
broadly beyond ASFA, much like Texas.90

86. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4041(A–2), 4002(1–B) (West 2011).
87. Id. The first aggravated circumstance is that the parent “has subjected a child for
whom the parent was responsible to rape, gross sexual misconduct, gross sexual assault,
sexual abuse, incest, aggravated assault, kidnapping, promotion of prostitution,
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse or any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to
society.”
88. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A–4–2, 32A–4–22 (West 2012). New Mexico defines
aggravated circumstances as attempting to, conspiring to, or causing great bodily harm or
death to the child, the child’s sibling, or the child’s parent; attempting to, conspiring to, or
subjecting the child to torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse; and prior involuntary
termination of parental rights to a sibling.
89. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 27–20–02, 27–20–32.2 (West 2011).
90. Id. Aggravated circumstances are present where a parent: abandons, tortures,
chronically abuses, or sexually abuses a child; fails to make substantial efforts to secure
treatment for an addiction, mental illness, or other condition for one year or one-half of the
child’s lifetime, whichever time period is less; engages in deviant sexual acts, sexual abuse,
etc. in which the victim is a child; commits murder, manslaughter, or negligently causes the
death of another, or attempts such crimes, where the victim is another child of the parent;
commits aggravated assault in which the victim is a child of the parent and suffers serious
bodily injury; commits assault, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment or terrorizing in
which a child is the victim or intended victim; or has been incarcerated under a sentence for
which the release date is after the child’s majority when the child is nine years old or older
or after the child is twice the child’s current age where the child is younger than nine years
old.
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B. ASFA-Only: The Core Four

Seven states use the term “aggravated circumstances” or “aggravating
circumstances” to mean the four core enumerated circumstances in ASFA:
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse.91 Georgia,92
Mississippi,93 Nebraska,94 North Carolina,95 Rhode Island,96 West
Virginia,97 and Wisconsin98 describe these four circumstances as nonexhaustive situations included in the definition, mirroring the ASFA
provision that aggravated circumstances are to be defined by the states and
may include but are not limited to those four situations.99
Three other states—Montana,100 South Carolina,101 and New
Jersey102—have either minor additions to or use variations of the ASFA
core four, but are otherwise limited in their definitions.
91. See supra note 5. Aggravated circumstances may include but are not limited to the
core four of abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and/or sexual abuse.
92. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-58 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances “may
include” the enumerated core four.
93. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 43-21-603(7) (West 2011). Aggravated circumstances
include but are not limited to the core four.
94. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-283.201 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances
“include” the core four.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7B-1111, 7B-507 (West 2012). Aggravated
circumstances “include” the core four.
96. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-12.2 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances
include the core four.
97. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances “include, but
are not limited to” the core four.
98. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.355 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances include the
core four.
99. See supra note 6.
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-423 (West 2011). While Montana also includes
“chronic, severe neglect” alongside the core four, this addition is more the like variation seen
infra note 59, than the elaborations in subgroup (E), and so is included in subgroup (B).
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1640 (West 2011). Aggravated circumstances include
sexual abuse, torture, or abandonment, as well as “severe or repeated abuse or neglect.”
While this does not mirror the exact ASFA language of “chronic abuse,” it is substantially
similar to be included in this list, especially given Bean’s analysis that “chronic abuse,” as
used to refer to aggravated circumstances, can include abuse that immediately or irreparably
inflicts very serious harm or abuse that is repeated, continuing, intractable, or resistant to
change. See also Bean, supra note 2, at 265-66.
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-11.2, 30:4C-11.3 (West 2012). Reasonable efforts are
not required when the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse,
neglect, cruelty, or abandonment. This list appears to be limited to just these four situations,
and “torture” has been replaced with “cruelty.” The absence of the intensifier “chronic” may
not necessarily influence judicial interpretation of the provision, as “aggravated
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C. ASFA by Any Other Name
Four states and the District of Columbia list the core four of
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse, or a cluster of
situations substantially similar to the core four, as conditions excusing
reasonable efforts, but do not use the term “aggravated circumstances” in
the statute. Delaware lists torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, and/or lifethreatening abuse together, while abandonment appears earlier in the
statute. The District of Columbia lists the core four and adds cruelty to the
same provision.103 Maryland includes chronic abuse, sexual abuse, and
torture, and while abandonment is not explicitly mentioned, “chronic and
life-threatening neglect” is included.104 South Dakota includes torture,
sexual abuse, abandonment, and chronic neglect or physical, mental, or
emotional injury.105 Alaska includes abandonment, sexual abuse, torture,
chronic mental injury, and chronic physical harm as examples of
“circumstances that pose a substantial risk of harm.”106
D. Undefined, Redirected, or Vague
A few states, conversely to those states in Part IV (C), include the term
“aggravated circumstances” but do not define it in the statute.
Connecticut107 and Kansas108 both excuse reasonable efforts where the
parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, without further
elaboration as to what that term means. New York109 and Oklahoma110
circumstances of” suggests that it is particularly severe or egregious instances of those
situations that the statute is addressing.
103. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1301.09a (West 2012).
104. M.D. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-812(b) (West 2012). Chronic neglect and
abandonment appear to be different situations based on other statutory constructions, and
abandonment, as defined in other statutes, is not per se life-threatening neglect. Still, the
substantial similarity between the Maryland statute and the ASFA core four warrants
inclusion in this grouping.
105. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.1 (West 2012). Chronic neglect or chronic
physical, mental, or emotional injury may be reasonably construed to include, more or less,
chronic abuse as contemplated in other jurisdictions.
106. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.086 (West 2012).
107. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-111b (West 2012). Reasonable efforts not required
if the parent “has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances.”
108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2255 (West 2012). The Kansas statute also includes
subjecting “another child to aggravated circumstances.”
109. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 358-a, 384-b (West 2012). Reasonable efforts are not
required when the court determines that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated
circumstances, where the child has been either severely or repeatedly abused.
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have relatively vague definitions of aggravated circumstances, though they
might be interpreted as covering the substantive portions of the ASFA core
four.
Colorado does not require reasonable efforts where “the parent has
subjected the child to aggravated circumstances to such an extent that
grounds exist for termination of the parent’s parental rights” as outlined in
another statute.111 While Louisiana does not include the term “aggravated
circumstances” in its statute, it otherwise closely resembles the Colorado
statute as reunification efforts are not required where the “parent has
subjected the child to egregious conduct or conditions, including any of the
grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to Article 1015.”112

110. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-809 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances
include but are not limited to heinous and shocking abuse or neglect.
111. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-115 (West 2012). The statute directs the reader to
§ 19-3-604(1) for a description of those grounds, which are extensive. Among the many
grounds are “an identifiable pattern of sexual abuse” and “torture of or extreme cruelty to the
child.” To the extent that abandonment or chronic abuse are implicated, they are in
conjunction with other findings of the court, criminal convictions, certain lengths of time, or
resulting serious bodily injury or death. As a result of these substantial variations and
limitations on the ASFA core four, as well as the redirection to another statute specifically in
reference to grounds for termination of parental rights, not just excusing reasonable efforts,
Colorado is included in subgroup (D) and not (E).
112. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 672.1 (2012). Like the Colorado statute, the Louisiana
statute redirects the reader to the termination of parental rights statute to elaborate on the
excusing grounds. This structural similarity to Colorado’s statute suggests that for analytic
purposes, the Louisiana statute should be listed in subgroup (D), not cluster (C) with the
other statutes that do not use the term “aggravating circumstances” explicitly. Furthermore,
Article 1015, like Colorado’s § 19-3-604(1), includes a scattershot of terms akin to the
ASFA core four but insufficiently similar for inclusion in subgroup (E) and insufficiently
distinguishable for inclusion in another subgroup. For example, Art. 1015 includes
misconduct of the parent toward the child or another child which constitutes “extreme abuse,
cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard of
human decency, including but not limited to the conviction, commission, aiding or abetting,
attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit” twelve enumerated crimes, including
aggravated incest, rape, sodomy, torture, starvation, a felony resulting in serious bodily
injury, sexual abuse, and abuse or neglect which is “chronic, life threatening, or results in
grave disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement.” Louisiana continues to
improve its child welfare laws. As of June 11, 2012, reunification efforts are no longer
required where a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the parent has committed
murder or manslaughter of another child of the parent or any other child or committed a
felony resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent or any
other child (emphasis added to reflect changes). 2012 LA. SESS. LAW. SERV. ACT 730 (S.B.
152) (West).
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E. ASFA-Plus: Beyond the Core Four
Multiple states define “aggravated circumstances” as suggested in
ASFA. Their definitions may include but are not limited to abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse, and the overall statutory structure
generally treats the aggravated circumstances as separate from the other
ASFA excusing conditions.113
Alabama uses this structure particularly well. In addition to the ASFA
core four, the statute lists ten other circumstances included in the
definition.114 Arkansas similarly defines aggravated circumstances to
include three of the core four expressly, torture implicitly, and two
additional circumstances.115 Kentucky does not include the core four
expressly, but does list five separate circumstances that are aggravated.116
Michigan,117 Oregon,118 and Tennessee119 also take the enumerated
113. See supra note 6.
114. ALA. CODE § 12-15-312(c) (West 2012). An aggravated circumstance may include
but is not limited to: rape, sodomy, incest, aggravated stalking, abandonment, torture,
chronic abuse, or sexual abuse. An aggravated circumstance may also include: allowing a
child to use alcohol or illegal drugs to the point of abuse, neglect, or substantial risk of harm;
parental misuse or abuse of substances interfering with the ability to keep the child safe, and
parental refusal to participate in or complete treatment or treatment has been unsuccessful; a
demonstration of extreme disinterest in the child by not complying with the case plan for six
months or repeatedly leaving the child with someone unwilling or incapable of caring for the
child and not returning for the child as promised; an infant or young child has been
abandoned, identity unknown, and parent is unknown or unable to be found after a diligent
search; parent has emotional or mental condition for which there is clearly no treatment that
can improve or strengthen the condition enough to allow the child to remain at home or
return home safely; and/or the parent is incarcerated and the child is deprived of a safe,
stable, and permanent parent-child relationship.
115. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances may include
that a child “has been abandoned, chronically abused, subjected to extreme or repeated
cruelty, or sexually abused,” or a judge determines that there is little likelihood that services
to the family will result in successful reunification. Also included is removal of the child
from the parent or guardian’s custody and placement in foster care or custody of another
person three or more times in the past fifteen months.
116. K.Y. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 610.127, 600.020 (West 2012). Aggravated
circumstances include: no parental contact with the child for more than ninety days; parent is
incarcerated for at least one year, parent will be unavailable to care for child, and there is no
appropriate relative to care for the child; the parent has sexually abused the child and refused
available treatment; the parent has engaged in abuse of the child that required removal two
or more times in the last two years; and the parent has caused the child serious physical
injury. The statute lists five other provisions that excuse reasonable efforts, but they are not
included under aggravating circumstances.
117. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 712A.19a, 722.638 (2012). Aggravated circumstances
include abandoning a young child; criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted
penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate; battering, torture, or other severe physical
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expansion approach, mostly covering the ASFA core four along with other
circumstances.
Massachusetts defines aggravated circumstances as a relatively limited
variation on the ASFA core four,120 while Virginia expands on the ASFA
core four to include omissions enabling such conduct and resulting injury or
death of the child.121 Although Wyoming only includes one additional
provision defining aggravated circumstances beyond the ASFA core four,
the language is broad enough to encompass a variety of qualifying
situations.122
F. Missing in Action
Multiple states neither include the term “aggravated circumstances”
nor a readily identifiable recitation of the ASFA core four of abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse. Missouri, on the briefer end of the
spectrum, lists only four excusing conditions, one of which is subjecting
“the child to severe or recurrent acts of physical, emotional, or sexual

abuse; loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb; or life-threatening injury.
118. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.340 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances include
but are not limited to: causing a child’s death by abuse or neglect; attempting, soliciting, or
conspiring to cause a child’s death; causing serious physical injury to a child by abuse or
neglect; subjecting a child to rape, sodomy, or sexual abuse; subjecting a child to intentional
starvation or torture; abandoning the child; and unlawfully causing the death of the child’s
other parent.
Aggravated
119. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-102(9), 37-1-166 (West 2012).
circumstances include: abandonment; aggravated assault; aggravated or especially
aggravated kidnapping; aggravated child abuse and neglect; aggravated or especially
aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor; aggravated rape, rape of a child, or incest; and
severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102.
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29C (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances
may include murdering the child’s parent while the child is present, subjecting the child or
other children to sexual abuse or exploitation, or severe or repetitive conduct of physically or
emotionally abusive nature.
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-281 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances include
torture, chronic or severe abuse, or chronic and severe sexual abuse, if the victim was the
parent’s child or a child residing with the parent. They also include failure to protect the
child from such conduct, if the conduct or failure to protect demonstrates a wanton or
depraved indifference to human life, or has resulted in the death of the child or in serious
bodily injury to the child.
122. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(c) (West 2012). Excusing provisions include
abandonment, chronic abuse, torture, or sexual abuse of the child, as well as “other
aggravating circumstances . . . . indicating that there is little likelihood that services will
result in successful reunification.”
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abuse, including an act of incest.”123 More exhaustively, California lists
thirteen separate findings excusing reasonable efforts, but the core four are
either absent or paired with other conditions or results before they are
sufficient grounds to excuse reasonable efforts.124 Florida has eight
excusing provisions, and like California, they only implicate the ASFA core
four in connection with other terms and conditions.125 Minnesota includes
subjecting the child to “egregious harm” or abandonment as two of the
seven excusing conditions.126 Nevada describes three different forms of
abandonment as excusing conditions and includes where a “parent has
caused the abuse or neglect of the child or another child that resulted in
substantial bodily harm or was so extreme or repetitious as to result in an
unacceptable risk to the health and welfare of the child.”127 Utah prefaces
its statute that in “cases of obvious sexual abuse, abandonment, or serious
physical abuse or neglect,” there is no duty to make reasonable efforts.128
Utah further includes, among other very specific and more unusual
provisions, that “severe abuse by the parent or by any person known by the
123. MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.183 (West 2012). The three remaining provisions are
involuntary termination of parental rights as to a sibling, commission of felony assault
resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child, and commission of murder or
voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent.
124. CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2012). For example, infliction of
“severe physical or sexual abuse on the child or a sibling” is included, but the court must
also find “that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification with the offending
parent” for reasonable efforts to be excused. Similarly, abandoning a child is not a provision,
but “willfully” abandoning a child is.
125. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.521(1)(f), 39.806(1) (West 2012). Abandonment is only an
excusing condition where the child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been
filed with the court, and the child continues to be abandoned by the parents. Sexual abuse
and chronic abuse appear alongside aggravated child abuse and sexual battery of the child or
another child. Torture is not specifically mentioned, though one provision includes the
parent(s) engaging in “egregious conduct or [having] the opportunity and capability to
prevent and knowingly [failing] to prevent egregious conduct that threatened the life, safety,
or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling.”
126. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012 (West 2012). Minnesota’s five other excusing
conditions include involuntary termination of parental rights, involuntary transfer of
custodial rights to another relative, a determination “that additional reasonable efforts would
be futile and unreasonable under the circumstances,” or criminal convictions for various
violent or assaultive crimes against the child or another child.
127. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.393 (West 2011). The abandonment situations
include sixty days of abandonment or failure to make more than token contact for six
months; the failure of an unmarried father to visit the child, commence proceedings to
establish paternity, or provide support in the first year of the child’s life; and the delivery of
a child less than one year old to a provider of emergency services.
128. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-312 (West 2012).
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parent, and the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the
person was abusing the child” will also excuse.129 Illinois,130 Indiana,131
New Hampshire,132 and Ohio133 drift even further away from ASFA, as
most if not all of the excusing conditions require criminal convictions
before reunification services can end.
V. Case Law Grappling with Statutory Construction
The structural and substantive differences among state statutes do not
necessarily correlate with a particular kind of state jurisprudence regarding
when reasonable efforts are excused because there are aggravating
circumstances. Oregon, with its relatively broad statute, has invited judicial
interpretation that aggravated circumstances are “those involving relatively
more serious types of harm or detriment to a child” and include both
parents’ conduct and the “results of those actions and conditions, including
effects, direct and indirect, on [the] child.”134 Despite New Jersey’s
relatively terse statutory definition of aggravated circumstances, its courts
129. Id. One example of the specific and unusual inclusions stated that the “parent
permitted the child to reside, permanently or temporarily, where the parent knew or should
have known that a clandestine laboratory operation was located.”
130. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/5 (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/213.1 (West 2012). The parent must have been convicted of aggravated battery, aggravated
battery of a child, or felony domestic battery, “any one of which has resulted in serious
bodily injury to the minor or another child of the parent.”
131. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-21-5.6 (West 2012). The parent must have been
convicted of causing a suicide, involuntary manslaughter, rape, criminally deviant conduct,
child molestation, or exploitation of a victim who is the parent’s child or the child’s other
parent, or convicted of battery, aggravated battery, criminal recklessness, or neglect against a
child. Abandonment is also mentioned.
132. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:24-a (West 2012). There are six provisions, four
of which are convictions for various violent or assaultive crimes against the child, the child’s
siblings, or other family members in the home. The remaining two are court determinations
of abandonment and out-of-home placement for twelve of the most recent twenty-two
months where the placement was due to a finding of child neglect or abuse.
133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.419 (West 2011). There are seven excusing
conditions. The parent must have been convicted of assault, endangering children, rape,
sexual battery, corruption of a minor, or sexual imposition of the child or another child in the
household. Two require convictions for murder or voluntary manslaughter or conspiracy,
attempt, or complicity in those substantive crimes. Two are prior involuntary parental rights
termination and abandonment. The final two are somewhat unusual in their specificity. The
parent must have “repeatedly withheld medical treatment or food from the child” or “placed
the child at substantial risk of harm two or more times due to drug or alcohol abuse and have
rejected treatment two or more times.”
134. Bean, supra note 2, at 705.
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have defined “aggravating circumstances”135 and developed a methodology
to determine whether they excuse reasonable efforts.136 Additionally,
ASFA gives state courts discretion in individual cases, 137 and courts appear
willing to exercise that discretion while adjudicating when reasonable
efforts are not required.138 Perhaps because of this state-by-state discretion,
similarities among states sharing common statutory structures are not
necessarily robust.
A. The Umbrella
Of the eleven states with an umbrella-type structure, four do not have
appellate jurisprudence on the meaning of aggravated circumstances.139
The remaining seven states only have one or two cases on point.140 While
the Supreme Court of Idaho held that abuse includes where a child is a
135. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 824 A.2d 213, 233–34
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (stating that aggravating circumstances embody “the
concept that the nature of the abuse or neglect must have been so severe or repetitive that to
attempt reunification would jeopardize … the safety of the child, and would place the child
in a position of an unreasonable risk to be [re-abused]. Moreover, any circumstances that
increase the severity of the abuse or neglect or add to its injurious consequences, equates to
‘aggravated circumstances.’”).
136. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 179 N.J. 264, 283-84
(2004) (discussing “aggravated circumstances”).
137. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 678 (West 2012) (“Rule of Construction. Nothing in this part
shall be construed as precluding State courts from exercising their discretion to protect the
health and safety of children in individual cases, including cases other than those described
in § 471(a)(15)(D).”).
138. See In re Marino S., 100 N.Y.2d 361, 372 (2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1059
(2003) (finding no error in terminating parental rights without first making reasonable efforts
to reunify family, as reasonable efforts would only be required if in the best interests of the
children and not contrary to their health and safety); J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388, 389 (Alaska
2002) (finding that where there had been devastating sexual abuse, the fundamental right of
a child to safety was not trumped by a person’s fundamental right to parent); In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 489 (Iowa 2000) (interpreting ASFA as eliminating the reasonable efforts
requirement for certain types of parental behavior); People ex rel. J.S.B., Jr., 691 N.W.2d
611, 617 (S.D. 2004) (interpreting ASFA to tip the balancing formula for reunification of
parents with children in favor of protecting children and not on the side of protecting
parents’ rights, where they conflict); Guardian Ad Litem Program v. T.R., 987 So. 2d 1269,
1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (excusing case planning where parents committed egregious
conduct).
139. Arizona’s appellate record does not flesh out the definition of aggravating
circumstances, and those cases that might be on point are designated without legal precedent
and are not to be cited. Hawaii and Vermont do not have much jurisprudence at the
appellate levels on this topic at all. Texas has an appellate record, but none of the cases deal
directly with defining aggravated circumstances.
140. Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
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victim of failure to thrive under its Child Protective Act and that long-term
food deprivation constitutes chronic abuse, other states trend toward
explaining the types of treatment that constitute aggravated circumstances,
not delineating specific circumstances that qualify.141 For example, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota found that one child’s “shaken baby
syndrome” (now more appropriately referred to as “abusive head trauma”)
was sufficiently aggravating to warrant taking all the siblings into custody,
including a baby born after the incident.142 The court also articulated that a
parent’s failure to cooperate with social services indicates that the causes
and conditions of the children’s removal are likely to continue or will not
be remedied, and that for children with special needs, parents are given less
leeway to meet the minimum community standards of parenting.143 The
appellate court of New Mexico has taken notice of its statute’s redundancy
regarding prior termination of parental rights to a sibling: such a prior
termination bypasses the reasonable efforts requirement either in its own
right or as an aggravating circumstance.144 Just as New Mexico’s
consideration of its aggravated circumstances statute has been limited,
Pennsylvania’s has also been brief. The court has spoken only to reverse a
lower court’s incorrect retroactive application of the aggravated
circumstances amendments to a case from 1998.145
Among the umbrella states, Maine stands apart in its thorough
explanation of the use of the word “subjected” in terms of aggravated
circumstances. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute’s plain
141. See Doe v. State, 144 Idaho 420, 420 (2007) (affirming the father’s termination of
parental rights. . . . [F]ather had subjected…children to excessive corporal punishment,
denied them food, access to the bathroom, and medical care. A pediatrician found it would
take five months of consistent food deprivation to reach that child’s emaciated condition).
142. See In re K.B., 801 N.W.2d 416, 425 (N.D. 2011) (holding that there was not a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made).
143. See id at 421.
144. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 850
(N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the redundancy does not affect the outcome of the case
and defends the use of a prior termination as a trigger for excusing reasonable efforts. The
court opines that where the State has a substantial interest in protecting children and the
government has a legitimate interest in making the best use of limited resources, a
Legislature’s determination that a prior termination is a factor to consider is both
“reasonable and legitimate”).
145. See In re R.T., 778 A.2d 670, 673 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding that the
retroactive application of aggravated circumstances deprived a parent of his vested right to
parent his children and be given a plan for their return since a prior termination of parental
rights was given a different legal effect from that which it had under the law in effect when it
transpired).
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language did not limit its reach only to affirmative or criminal acts, as
“subjected to” includes mere exposure to the circumstances meeting the
requirements for aggravated circumstances.146 Importantly, the court also
noted that the statute anticipates that certain acts, even when they do not
result in criminal prosecutions, can meet the definition for aggravated
circumstances: parental behavior need only fall far outside the norm of
ordinary, fallible parental behavior, not necessarily into criminally culpable
conduct.147
This broad-sweeping use of the umbrella structure and “subjected to”
language contrasts sharply with the limited holdings in the appellate courts
of Iowa and Washington. An Iowa appellate court held recently that three
older children’s mere presence in the home while one sibling drowned and
another was tortured did not support a threshold finding supporting the
waiver of reasonable reunification efforts because it was not clear and
convincing evidence of aggravated circumstances under the statute.148 In a
similar statutory bind, an appellate court in Washington found that the trial
court erred in using the aggravated circumstances statute to excuse
reasonable efforts because the parent had not raped the child in the instant
proceeding, but rather had raped the child’s older sister.149 Despite this
error, the termination of parental rights was upheld on other grounds.150
Courts in states with umbrella-type statutes appear to rely more heavily on
specific provisions, such as abuse of other siblings or criminal charges,

146. See In re Ashley S., 762 A.2d 941, 947 (Me. 2000) (finding in a case where a twoyear-old girl was removed from a home with shockingly dangerous and unsanitary
conditions after the death of her two-month-old brother that the father’s failure to even
notice his son’s death for most of a day was clear and convincing evidence of deprivation of
supervision).
147. See id.
148. See In re T.H. Jr., 801 N.W.2d 34 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished table
opinion) (revealing that the children’s guardian ad litem recommended the father’s rights be
terminated, and there was no reasonable belief that the conditions leading to the abuse or
neglect could be remedied through services in a reasonable amount of time, but that
nevertheless the court reversed the termination of parental rights and waiver of reasonable
efforts as to the three older children who had witnessed the death of one younger sibling and
torture of another).
149. See In re Termination of C.L., 126 P.3d 1285, 1286 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that because subject child was not victim of child rape, father’s conviction was not
an aggravating circumstance).
150. See id. at 1287 (concluding that services would not have remedied the parental
deficiencies in the foreseeable future because the child was within eighteen months of
turning eighteen years old, the father was prohibited from having any contact with underage
females, and the father was not considered amenable to treatment).
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rather than “aggravated circumstances” as a broad class of egregious
circumstances.
B. ASFA-Only: The Core Four
ASFA-only states, where there is appellate jurisprudence on
aggravated circumstances appear to construe the term more broadly to offer
more protection to children in unenumerated but egregious circumstances.
Of the ten states defining aggravated circumstances within the limits of the
federal statutory examples, five do not have appellate cases addressing
further explications of aggravated circumstances.151 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey developed a four-prong test to determine whether or not
aggravated circumstances excusing reasonable reunification efforts exist.152
In A.R.G., the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered separate lines of
inquiry to determine aggravated circumstances: (1) Did the alleged conduct
take place? If not, family reunification efforts are required.153 If yes, (2)
was the conduct severe or repetitive? If yes, the court must determine (3)
whether reunification would jeopardize and compromise the child’s safety
and welfare. There are then two additional prongs.154 First, (4a) asks if the
abuse is of such nature that standing alone it compels the conclusion that
reunification should not be required, e.g. conduct particularly heinous or
abhorrent to society, involving savage, brutal, or repetitive beatings, torture,
or sexual abuse?155 Second, (4b) is this a case of abandonment, corporal
punishment not resulting in permanent injury, or serious neglect and mental
abuse, etc., which may or may not support the conclusion that reuniting the
family will place the child at risk?156 The court may consider whether to
admit expert testimony and the conduct and its relationship to the parentchild bond, along with an assessment of the parents’ remedial efforts as

151. These include Georgia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin. See supra notes 92, 95-96, 98, 101.
152. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 179 N.J. 264, 274 (N.J.
2004) (holding that aggravating circumstances eliminating the requirement of reasonable
efforts to reunify the child with the parent embody the concept that the nature of abuse or
neglect must be so severe that attempts at reunification would jeopardize and compromise
the safety of the child).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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either sufficient or insufficient to eliminate an unreasonable risk of future
harm to the child.157
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, citing to A.R.G., held that aggravated
circumstances are determined on a case-by-case basis and that it is neither
possible nor necessary to determine the entire spectrum of aggravated
circumstances.158 Nebraska continues to illuminate the universe of
aggravated circumstances, which includes delaying medical attention when
a child suffers obvious severe physical injuries; severe physical injury
through intentional abuse; starving children; and making false medical
reports to obtain unnecessary medical operations on children.159 Nebraska
further relaxes aggravated circumstances’ attendant requirements, finding
that the extent of a child’s injuries are relevant to aggravated circumstances
determinations, even though permanent injury is not a prerequisite to a
finding, and that abuse of any child by an adult, regardless of whether it is
the parent’s child, calls the adult’s ability to parent into serious question.160
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, reviving language from a preASFA case, notes that circumstantial evidence excluding every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence, although perhaps not every possible doubt or
theoretical supposition, is sufficient to find aggravated circumstances.161
The Supreme Court of Montana has explained the meaning of chronic
neglect and abuse in the context of aggravating circumstances: when
parents’ conduct amounts to recurring instances of abuse or neglect over
time, there is a clear basis for the trial court to find chronic and severe
neglect.162
Notably, none of these states have statutorily defined what constitutes
torture as it relates to child abuse. Very few cases actually venture into a
157. Id.
158. See In re Jac’Quez N., 669 N.W.2d 429, 434–35 (Neb. 2003) (explaining that the
court had not . . . [defined] “aggravated circumstances” and scope of “but not limited to”
under the state statute, but nevertheless concluding that aggravated circumstances are further
determined in the context of whether reunification attempts would jeopardize and
compromise the child’s safety).
159. See generally In re Ryder J., 809 N.W.2d 555 (Neb. 2012) (detailing the court’s
previous findings of aggravated circumstances not specifically enumerated in the state
statute).
160. See id.
161. See In re D.O., 798 So.2d 417, 422 (Miss. 2001) (citing Aldridge v. State, 398
So.2d 1308, 1311 (Miss. 1981)) (upholding a father’s termination of parental rights where
the mother reported the father’s sexual abuse of their three-year-old and there was strong
medical evidence supporting the allegation).
162. See In re M.N., 261 P.3d 1047, 1051 (Mont. 2011) (noting that children need not
be left to “twist in the wind” before neglect can be found to be chronic and severe).
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definition of what constitutes torture as well. In Illinois, however, multiple
children appealed a lower court ruling that failed to define their emotional
abuse as torture.163 In In re A.G., three children were forced to hold down
their sibling while their mother beat the child into unconsciousness. While
the children at issue were not physically abused themselves, they submitted
to the court that they were nevertheless tortured and subjected to emotional
harm. The Appellate Court referred to the dictionary definition of torture
and determined that because the children were subject to mental anguish,
the mother’s actions constituted torture. In another, older case, also in
Illinois, the Court found that a mother’s presence while her boyfriend
poured lighter fluid and lit her two children on fire was sufficient to
constitute torture.164 The Court held that the mother was an unfit parent
because she did not halt the boyfriend’s abuse, allowed the children to be
deprived of food, and stood by without taking any action during the
boyfriend’s torturous actions.165
C. ASFA By Any Other Name
Of the four states with this type of statute, two do not have appellate
jurisprudence on point.166 The Supreme Court of South Dakota has held
that the wording of the statute not requiring reunification efforts where the
parent has “committed a crime” is distinct from “convicted of a crime,” and
so no conviction is required to invoke the bypass provision, only clear and
convincing evidence of the conduct.167
Delaware’s jurisprudence, all at the Family Court level (except the
affirmation of a recent Family Court decision by the Delaware Supreme
Court),168 mostly deals with the ASFA-type provisions in the context of
who decides whether or not reunification efforts are required. In addition to
cases cited previously in Part II, some earlier cases held that the
163. See In re A.G., 325 Ill. App. 3d 429, 430 (3rd Div. 2001) (reversing a holding that
did not consider nonphysical torture and remanding with directions to find whether there
was mental torture of three minors).
164. See In Interest of Lakita B., 697 N.E. 2d 830, 832 (1998) (holding that the statute
allows removal of the child from the parents’ custody if the parent is found to be either unfit,
unwilling, or unable to care for the child).
165. See id.
166. Alaska and Maryland.
167. See In re E.L. & R.L., 707 N.W.2d 841, 846 (2005) (relating that aggravated
circumstances were apparent from the infant’s life-threatening injuries, caused by shaking).
168. DFS. v. A.L., No. 11–08–09TN, 2012 WL 4861426, at 21 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2012),
aff’d Long v. DFS, 2012 WL 6525082 (Del. 2013, decided Dec. 13, 2012).
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Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families was the
“sole arbiter” of the decision whether to provide reunification efforts once
the Court determined that the parent had violated a termination of parental
rights ground under DEL. CODE. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(4).169 Other Family
Court judges have agreed, with the caveat that the decision is subject to
Family Court review for arbitrariness or capriciousness.170 In Jill’s case, as
highlighted above, the Family Court determined that DFS did not act in an
arbitrary or capricious fashion in determining that it could be excused from
making reasonable efforts to reunify the family pursuant to DEL. CODE. tit.
13, § 1103(d) on the grounds of serious unexplained injury.171
Inconsistencies exist at the trial level, however, as other judges have
stated in dicta that the court in the first instance, not in review of social
services, is required to determine whether to offer or deny reasonable
efforts.172 One trial court judge denied the Division’s motion for no
reasonable efforts because the parent’s conduct was not an offense within
the statute: the father vaginally penetrating his stepdaughter on three
separate occasions.173 Delaware’s statute has since been changed from “the
child” to “a child,” which captures cases of parent’s abusing children other
than their own biological children. These inconsistencies likely arise
because of the complexity of cases, factual differences, the various rights at
stake, and long-term consideration of whether reunification should be
contemplated.
D. Undefined, Redirected, or Vague
Of the six states with undefined or vague definitions of aggravated
circumstances, four lack case law on point.174 The Court of Appeals of
New York, while holding that the retroactive application of ASFA did not
impair parents’ vested rights because the statute was remedial in nature,175
also held that “heinous acts and utter disregard for a child’s life” by parents
169. See generally In re Phillips, 806 A.2d 616 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2002). See also In re
A.M.P., 2002 WL 31445226 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 1, 2002).
170. See In re Div. of Family Servs. v. B.S., 2008 WL 2898228 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 3,
2008) (holding that federal and state laws permit DFS not to plan for reunification with the
parents).
171. See generally Dept. of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families v. A.L. &
J.M., 11-14486 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2011).
172. Div. of Family Servs. v. James, 2009 WL 6328182 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 18, 2009).
173. Div. of Family Servs. v. C.A., 2006 WL 4546456 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 17, 2006).
174. Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.
175. But see supra note 119.
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excused reunification services.176 Connecticut has a similarly limited
jurisprudence. The one Supreme Court case on point, a severe injury case of
“shaken baby syndrome” (now more accurately termed “abusive head
trauma“), was notable for interpreting the state statute to mean that social
services either had to show that it made reasonable efforts or that the
parents were unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts, but
not both.177 It appears from the case law that states without clearly defined
aggravated circumstances struggle to articulate standards for when
reunification services are excused, even in the most egregious cases.
E. ASFA-Plus: Beyond the Core Four
Of the nine states in this subgroup, three do not have cases on point.178
The appellate court in Tennessee has held that prenatal drug abuse by the
mother and the provision of those drugs by the father constituted severe
child abuse for purposes of terminating parental rights.179 Alabama’s
appellate courts have broadly held that committing abusive acts against a
child’s sibling are aggravated circumstances excusing reasonable efforts.180
Michigan’s appellate courts have also held specific circumstances to be
aggravating and excuse reasonable efforts, including: placing a child at an
unreasonable risk of harm by failing to take reasonable steps to intervene to
eliminate the risk of abuse;181 a criminal conviction for battering the
child;182 inflicting life-threatening injuries on a child during a psychotic
176. In re Marino S., 100 N.Y.2d 361, 763 N.Y.S.2d 796 (N.Y. 2003). Both parents
were convicted of various crimes after the mother, in order to assist the father in concealing
his rape of their eight year-old daughter, spent hours cleaning their apartment for evidence
before taking the child to a hospital. The mother insisted on a hospital 115 blocks away,
despite the presence of several, much closer emergency rooms.
177. In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539 (Conn. 2009). In addition to abusive head trauma,
resulting in substantial neurological impairment, the five-week-old child appeared to have
been severely abused, including blunt force trauma to the head. The mother had allowed the
father to be alone with their child even after witnessing aggressive behavior and suspecting
that he had been smothering their baby.
178. Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Wyoming.
179. In re Joshua E.R., 2012 WL 1691620 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2012).
180. C.J. v. Marion Cty. Dep’t. of Human Resources, 5 So.3d 1259 (Ala. Civ. App.
2008) (upholding a termination of parental rights as to a newborn child removed from
parents’ care at birth, after the parents had previously consented to a termination of parental
rights to their two-month-old child, who suffered serious brain injuries from being violently
shaken by the father).
181. In re Coleman, 2012 WL 1649092 (Mich. Ct. App. May 10, 2012).
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break;183 and the doctrine of anticipatory neglect based on the treatment of a
child’s other or older siblings.184
Virginia’s appellate courts have also addressed the intersection of
aggravated circumstances and criminal law, holding that the term “felony
assault” in the statute means any felonious crime that results in serious
bodily injury to a child of the parent, whether committed by act or
omission, since the focus is on the effect on the child, not the parent’s
intent.185 Virginia has also clarified the different evidentiary burdens for
showing abuse or aggravated abuse.186
Oregon’s appellate court has used statutory construction analysis to
determine whether an instant case falls within the non-exclusive universe of
aggravated circumstances. In Oregon, aggravated circumstances involve:
relatively more serious types of harm or detriment to a child; require only
circumstances and not actions or conditions of the parent; include the direct
and indirect results of actions and condition; and are not limited to
intentional conduct.187 Arkansas has also defined aggravated circumstances
at the appellate level to include parents acting in concert to cause injuries to
a child’s sibling, or failing to prevent the injuries and protect the child while
knowing that someone was causing the injuries that resulted in the sibling’s
death;188 extensive burns with an inconsistent and implausible
182. In re Kelly, 2011 WL 4424315 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2011) (finding it
unnecessary to inquire whether the child’s injuries constituted severe physical abuse because
the conviction for battery itself was an aggravating circumstance).
183. In re DeHuff, 2011 WL 2936793 (Mich. Ct. App. July 21, 2011) (rejecting the
mother’s argument that because she was incompetent to stand trial and found not guilty by
reason of insanity in a criminal proceeding after her parental rights were terminated, she had
not acted intentionally in stabbing her son in the chest). Instead, the court found that the
mother’s ability to form intent was irrelevant because the focus of the proceeding was
protecting the child, not her criminal guilt).
184. In re Wilson, 2010 WL 4649088 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008).
185. Brown v. Spotsylvania Dep’t. of Social Servs., 43 Va. App. 205, 597 S.E.2d 214
(Va. Ct. App. 2004); see also Kilby v. Culpeper Cty. Dep’t. of Social Servs., 55 Va. App.
106, 684 S.E.2d 219 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
186. Richmond Dep’t. of Social Servs. v. Enriquez, 2004 WL 1555345 (Va. Ct. App.
July 13, 2004) (explaining that a quantum of evidence insufficient to support terminating
parental rights under an abuse standard is insufficient to support a termination under a more
aggravated abuse standard).
187. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t. of Benton Cty. v. Risland, 183 Or.App. 293, 51 P.3d
697 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). The court used the principle of ejusdem generis, i.e. that the
general category will be comprised of the same characteristics as the specifically enumerated
examples, to generate this list.
188. Fortenberry v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 352 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2009).
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explanation;189 complicity in a child’s blindness and permanent brain
damage from failing to protect an eight week old child from being shaken
by the other parent;190 and extreme and repeatedly cruelty from knowingly
leaving a child with an abusive boyfriend who later killed the child.191
Case law from these states suggests that where the aggravated
circumstances statute is more robust and broadly defined, courts will take
their cue and extend the universe of aggravated circumstances to include
cases of egregious behavior resulting in severe bodily injury to a child or a
child’s sibling, even when the actual perpetrator is uncertain.
F. Missing in Action
Unsurprisingly, most states that do not mention aggravated
circumstances in their statutes do not address them in their jurisprudence.192
Only one of these ten states touches on the topic. Utah’s appellate court has
held that some circumstances constitute prima facie evidence of parental
unfitness, including sexual abuse or exploitation, injury, or death of a
sibling or any child due to known or substantiated abuse or neglect by the
parent.193
VI. Strengthening Delaware’s Aggravated Circumstances Statute
Delaware has the opportunity to strengthen its statutory language
regarding aggravated circumstances in two circumstances. First, Delaware
can expand grounds for termination of parental rights. Second, Delaware
can enable the Division of Family Services to more consistently forgo
providing reasonable efforts at reunification where parents are the primary
caregivers and have no plausible explanation for a child’s serious physical
injuries. Despite the overriding goal of children’s best interests in Family

189. Mason v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 251 (Ark.
Ct. App. 2010).
190. Cox v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 2006 WL 3086187 (Ark. Ct.
App. Nov. 1, 2006).
191. Pfeiffer v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Human Servs., 2006 WL 290512 (Ark. Ct. App.
Feb. 8, 2006).
192. California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, and Ohio.
193. State ex rel. L.S., 2008 UT App. 398 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008).
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Court proceedings, amending and enhancing § 1103(a)(7)-(8) would make
the statute much more robust in protecting those interests.194
Delaware has very little child welfare jurisprudence involving serious
unexplained injury and torture cases. Several reasons may explain this
dearth of jurisprudence. First, child welfare proceedings are confidential,
so most written decisions regarding cases of serious child abuse remain
sealed from the public.195 Second, parents in such cases may voluntarily
terminate their parental rights rather than inculpate themselves for the
serious injury or abuse their child endured.196 Third, ASFA requires the
exploration of family members for placement of dependent, neglected, and
abused children when feasible.197 When an appropriate family member is
identified, the child is often placed with them, either temporarily or as one
means of achieving “permanency.” As a result, many cases do not proceed
to termination of parental rights on the grounds of unexplained serious
physical injury or torture because the parents will consent to a permanent
guardianship arrangement with a relative.198 Finally, cases involving
serious injury or torture199 may proceed to termination of parental rights on
other grounds, such as failure to plan, felony convictions, or
194. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103(a)(7) (2009) (“The parent has subjected a child to
torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, and/or life-threatening abuse.”); see also DEL. CODE tit.
13, § 1103(a)(8) (2009) (“A child has suffered unexplained serious physical injury, near
death or death under such circumstances as would indicate that such injuries, near death or
death resulted from the intentional or reckless conduct or willful neglect of the parent.”).
195. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1112(a) (West 2012) (“All court records and dockets
pertaining to any termination [of parental rights] shall be confidential . . . . ”).
196. See, e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. K.H., 10-15551 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 4, 2012).
197. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a) (West 2012). “In order for a State to be eligible for payments
under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which . . . . (19) provides that
the State shall consider giving preference to an adult relative over a non-related caregiver
when determining a placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all
relevant State child protection standards . . . .” Delaware complies with this requirement as
embodied by DEL. CODE tit. 31, § 356 (2012), which establishes a kinship care program that
“(a) promotes the placement of children with relatives when a child needs out-of-home
placement, when such placement is in the best interests of the child, and when the child is
not in the custody or care of the state.” Delaware’s preference for family placement once a
child is declared dependent or neglected is further implied by DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 1009
(2012): “(b) Following an adjudication by the Court in which it declares a child to be
dependent or neglected, the Court may . . . . (3) Grant custody of a child to any person or
agency where satisfactory arrangements can be made but, in the event the child is placed in a
home other than the home of a relative, the Court shall require an evaluation and report”
from the Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families.
198. See, e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. A.W., File Nos. CK08-01363 & CK08-01639
(Del. Fam. Ct. June 19, 2009).
199. A persistent problem with “torture.”
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abandonment.200 Consequently, broadening the scope of omissions or
failure to protect the child would give Family Courts more clarity as to
when terminating parental rights is justified and reasonable reunification
efforts are not required.
A. Causation vs. Omission in Child Abuse and Neglect
Some Family Court judges may be reluctant to attribute causation to
either primary parent caregiver when presented with a united front of denial
regarding serious child abuse and neglect. In such cases, the Court is
unlikely to be able to determine which parent committed the abuse and
which parent stood by, or whether both parents inflicted the abuse. In one
of the cases highlighted above, the Court determined by clear and
convincing evidence that Jill’s injuries were caused by the intentional or
reckless conduct or willful neglect by her parents because normal handling
of Jill could not have caused multiple fractures, Jill did not suffer from any
metabolic or organic disorders, and there was no history of accidental
trauma even though the injuries occurred while in the parents’ care.201 In
that case, the Court could not determine causation, but rather determined
that termination of parental rights grounds were met based on a
constellation of factors that showed the child’s injuries occurred while on
the parent givers’ watch.202 Because neither parent would explain how the
child sustained such severe injuries, their harmful actions or inaction, as the
case may be, were sufficient to terminate their rights.203 Nonetheless, under
Delaware’s current statute, without being able to find that the injuries
resulted from a specific parent’s actions, courts may not consistently agree
that DFS should be excused from planning with that parent or ensure that a
seriously injured child has an appropriately quick transition to a permanent
placement.204 Although expanding perpetration to include omission might
raise due process issues, such an expansion would probably pass

200. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.B., 2006 WL 1389860 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 4, 2006); In
re J.G.W. III, 2004 WL 3245804 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 10, 2004); Div. of Family Servs. v.
L.M. & C.M., 2002 WL 32101227 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 10, 2002); see also Div. of Family
Servs. V. B.M. & J.K., File No. CS09-03474 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan 9, 2012).
201. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., 11-08-09TN, 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. Ct.
May 23, 2012).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., DE Fam. Ct., FN:12-02-10T (Jan. 8,
2013).
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constitutional muster.205 For example, Oklahoma allows broad protections
for children and codified “enabling child abuse” as a crime, which includes
permitting, i.e. authorizing or allowing, for the care of a child by an
individual when the person permitting the care knows or reasonably should
know that the child will be placed at risk of abuse.206 Under this statute, the
Tenth Circuit upheld a murder conviction and death penalty sentence of
Donald Lee Gilson under a split theory of child abuse murder.207 Oklahoma
asserted that committing and permitting child abuse were merely different
means by which child abuse murder could be permitted, while Gilson
asserted that they were conceptually distinct crimes.208 The Tenth Circuit
found that the Oklahoma Legislature clearly stated its intention to punish as
first-degree murder either using unreasonable force or permitting the use of
unreasonable force upon a child when the child then dies.209
Further, the Tenth Circuit held that a unanimous jury verdict that
Gilson committed the crime satisfied due process and that a
“constitutionally unanimous verdict is required only with respect to the
ultimate issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged
and not with respect to alternative means by which the crime was
committed.”210 Gilson was denied federal habeas relief.211 Based on the
205. Broadening the class of perpetrators to include parents and guardians would clarify
that the statute is concerned with protecting children from their adult caretakers, not just
those with formal parental rights to them. While expanding the class of perpetrators to
include de facto parents, primary caretakers or caregivers, other responsible adults residing
in the home, or those individuals’ paramours would provide extraordinary protection to
children, such an expansion would probably fail. The court cannot terminate parental rights
to someone who has no such rights to begin with (so the provision would be moot), and the
court might violate a parent’s due process rights if his or her parental rights were terminated
based on the actions of another adult. Case law from other states suggests that this may not
be a legal barrier. See supra notes 142-143. However, the problem of parents allowing
abusers access to their children can still be resolved by elaborating on the causation
requirements of “subjected,” as discussed below.
206. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 843.5 (West 2012).
207. Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2008), affirming Gilson v.
Sirmons, No. CIV-01-1311-C, 2006 WL 2320682, at 1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 9, 2006). The jury
was divided as to the underlying theory of the crime, but unanimously found Gilson guilty of
child abuse murder and permitting child abuse murder. The State had alleged two theories
of the crime, either that Gilson was directly responsible for willfully or maliciously injuring,
torturing, maiming, or using unreasonable force upon eight year old Shane, or that he
knowingly permitted Coffman, Shane’s mother, to do so. Id. at 1203.
208. Id. at 1208.
209. Id. at 1209.
210. Id. at 1210.
211. Id. at 1212.
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Tenth Circuit’s reading of legislative intent with respect to causation in a
criminal statute, a similar civil statute that does not distinguish between
permitting and committing child abuse might also withstand a due process
challenge.212 Civil statutes that treat permitting and committing such abuse
identically have already been enacted in Arizona,213 Virginia,214 and
Florida.215 Terminations of parental rights based on similar reasoning of
parental inaction or failure to protect have also withstood appellate review
in New York216 and Connecticut.217 These developments further support
the constitutional validity of a similar statute in Delaware.
B. Define What It Means to “Subject” A Child To Abuse/Neglect.
In addition, case law from other states suggests that the statutory term
“subjected” includes acts of omission or commission and sometimes
exposure to conditions or failure to protect children from those conditions
or perpetrators.218 Rather than relying on judicial interpretation, however,
the Delaware statute could define what constitutes “subjecting a child to a
condition or circumstance.” Such language might include either an express
definition of “subjected” or an enumerated list of other verbs in addition to
“subjected to.” Such a definition could include “has exposed, caused,
enabled, allowed, or permitted” and so forth, thus expanding the types of
affirmative conduct or omissions that satisfy the causal element. Including
wording such as “exposed, enabled, or allowed” would also permit courts to
terminate parental rights in cases where the parent was not the actual
perpetrator, but rather failed to protect the child from the perpetrator.

212. Criminal courts have reasoned similarly. See supra note 131.
213. See supra note 85. Aggravated circumstances exist where the child has suffered
severe physical or emotional injury by the parent or a person known to the parent.
214. See supra note 121. Aggravated circumstances include failure to protect the child
from torture, chronic or severe abuse, or chronic and severe sexual abuse, if the conduct or
failure to protect demonstrates a wanton or depraved indifference to human life or results in
the death or serious bodily injury of the child.
215. See supra note 125. Having the capability and opportunity to prevent and
knowingly failing to prevent egregious conduct threatening the life, safety, or physical,
mental, or emotional health of the child is a circumstance excusing reasonable efforts.
216. See supra note 176. Mother’s parental rights were terminated after she aided
father in concealing his rape of their eight year-old daughter.
217. See supra note 177. Mother’s parental rights were terminated after she left the
father alone with their child even after witnessing aggressive behavior and suspecting he had
been smothering their child.
218. See supra note 151.
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For example, in Jill’s case, the court concluded that although it could
not determine which of the parents abused baby Jill, it nevertheless found
clear and convincing evidence that the parents “were her caretakers during
the relevant time frames and other explanations provided by the parents
were not credible nor the product of sound logic.”219 But, in Matt’s case,
the court did not find such that the baby’s injuries were the direct result of
the mother’s action or willful neglect by clear and convincing evidence.220
Alternatively, Oregon jurisprudence has determined that abuse includes the
direct and indirect actions and conditions of a parent caregiver, without
limit to intentional conduct.221 In addition, because case law in other
jurisdictions strongly supports a finding of aggravated circumstances for
conduct that includes where a parent exposed, enabled, or allowed a child to
endure abuse or torture, such a statutory revision will likely pass
constitutional muster in Delaware. Therefore, adding the term “subjected”
to Delaware’s aggravated circumstances statute would provide both
uniformity and clarity for the Delaware Family Court to find aggravated
circumstances exist when parents fail to protect or enable abuse to occur.
C. Simplify the statute
Under Delaware’s statute, a child must have “suffered unexplained
serious physical injury, death, or near death under such circumstances as
would indicate that the injuries, near death or death resulted from the
intentional or reckless conduct or wilful [sic] neglect of the parent.”222 This
causation requirement may be problematic in cases where two or more
primary caregivers are the presumptive perpetrators of abuse or neglect
resulting in serious bodily injury, but no one caregiver is identified as the
actual perpetrator.
This problem invites comparison to Summers v. Tice.223 In some ways,
such abuse may be “over-determined” when the pool of possible
perpetrators is very small, such as two co-primary caregivers, and one or
219. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., No. 11-08-09TN, 2012 WL 4861426, at 15 (Del.
Fam. Ct. May 23, 2012).
220. See Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., 11-22215 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 10, 2011).
221. See ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t. of Benton City v. Risland, 51 P.3d 697, 705 (Or. Ct.
App. 2002).
222. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(8) (2009).
223. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (holding that under the
circumstances presented each defendant is liable for the whole damage, whether they are
deemed to be acting in concert or not).
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both must have been the perpetrator, but it is not possible to prove by clear
and convincing evidence or any higher evidentiary standard which
person(s) actually committed the abuse. While criminal guilt cannot be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in such circumstances, the civil tort
system has resolved the Summers v. Tice problem by holding both parties
liable. However, in Family Court proceedings, where the issue is not
monetary damages but rather the fundamental right to parent, proceeding to
termination of parental rights using this strict rule may raise due process
issues. Perhaps, where the issue is just the states’ obligation or excusal
from case planning or providing reunification services, due process may not
be implicated.224 This suggests that where there is a Summers v. Tice
causation problem, the state may be equally excused from planning with the
possible perpetrators, even in the absence of statutory language regarding
abuse by omission or willful blindness.
Take for example Matt’s case. There, the court225 determined that
Matt was abused,226 neglected227 and dependent.228 Notwithstanding the
court’s findings based upon uncontroverted evidence that Matt was
seriously injured, and that the mother was a primary caregiver, the court
would not excuse DFS from case planning.229 The court, although deeply
troubled by the facts of the case, felt constrained by the wording of the
serious unexplained injury statute because it could not determine whether
mother actually caused Matt’s injuries or whether Matt’s injuries resulted
from her intentional or reckless conduct or willful neglect.230
In contrast, a Delaware Family Court judge wrestled with whether
DFS could be excused from case planning for reunification when two
primary caregivers failed to provide a plausible explanation for lifethreatening injuries to their nine week-old baby. Kate’s231 injuries included
224. See In re K.R., No. 99-2009, 2000 WL 854325 (Iowa Ct. App. June 28, 2000)
(determining the statutory directive to employ reasonable services, absent aggravated
circumstances, does not give rise to a constitutional right; parents have a fundamental liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children, but state-sponsored efforts at
reunification are not constitutionally mandated); see also Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,
363 (1992).
225. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., 11-22215 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 15, 2011).
226. tit. 10, § 901(1) (2012); tit. 16, § 902(1) (2012).
227. tit. 10, § 901 (18) (2012).
228. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (8) (2012).
229. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., 11-22215 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 15, 2011).
230. Id. Note, although the court acknowledged that Matt’s injuries were indeed very
troubling, there were other factors in play that caused the Court to determine DFS could not
be excused from case planning with mother.
231. The child has been given a pseudonym to protect her identity.
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thirty-three fractures in various stages of healing and the letters “F” and
“U” carved into her left side.232 The evidence showed that the parents were
Kate’s primary caregivers, and they kept the door closed in the room they
shared with her ninety percent of the time.233 One week prior to Kate’s
long-term hospital admission, the parents took her to the hospital with a
possible spider bite on her back. At the emergency room, a physician’s
assistant determined that the baby had “a soft tissue growth to the back”
and recommended follow-up with Kate's pediatrician. Seven days later,
Kate was hospitalized with life-threatening injuries. Baby Kate had
extensive fractures and numerous other injuries, including fractured
extremities, at least twelve acute rib fractures, pulmonary contusion, pleural
effusion, bruising and swelling to various body parts, and other injuries.234
The pediatric child abuse expert diagnosed Kate with child physical abuse
and a life threatening chest injury. The doctors determined that the lump on
her back diagnosed during the first emergency room visit was actually bone
fragments sticking out from rib fractures. In the intervening period between
the two hospital visits, the parents disregarded the emergency room
instructions and failed to follow up with the pediatrician.235
Although the Court was convinced that one or both caregivers
perpetrated the abuse, it could not make a legal finding of “abuse”236
because it was unable to determine who actually inflicted the “horrendous
injuries.”237 The Court, deeply disturbed by the extent and severity of the
baby’s injuries, was nonetheless constrained by the language of Delaware’s
torture/chronic abuse statute because its current form suggests a causation
element. Consequently, the Court could not find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the parents had subjected the child to torture, chronic abuse,
and life threatening abuse pursuant to § 1103 (a)(7).238 The statutory
changes we propose here, adding “subjected to” (with the definition), would
address causation (or the lack thereof) in cases of abuse or torture and
would circumvent the problem that courts faced in these cases where the
judge was unable to reconcile the egregious facts with the law requiring
some form of conduct by the parent. Our recommended statutory change to
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Div. of Family Servs. v. K.H., 10-15551 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 4, 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(1) (2012); tit. 16, § 902(1) (2012).
Div. of Family Servs. v. K.H., 10-15551 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 4, 2012).
Id.
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Title 13 §1103 (a)(7) defining “subjected to” to include enabling or
allowing such treatment of a child would provide the Court with the
necessary language to find that the parent subjected the child to torture and
chronic abuse in the cases discussed above without the element of causation
when caregivers act as a united front.239
Other states have resolved this causation issue as it relates to being
excused from reasonable efforts and termination of parental rights. In cases
of egregious abuse where one parent is more suspect than the other, willful
blindness will not preserve parental rights240 without specifically finding
which parents inflicted injuries.241
In contrast to Delaware, other state courts have determined that
parental inaction may be tantamount to perpetration of child abuse in
unexplained serious injury cases. For example, in a case strikingly similar
to baby Jill’s case highlighted above, a seven-month-old baby from Rhode
Island, Chester, entered child protective services custody for fractures in
various stages of healing on six ribs, his tibia, ulna, and radius bones as
well as severe abdominal trauma.242 Chester’s parents testified and
repeatedly reiterated that they did not inflict and had no idea what caused
Chester's extensive injuries.243 The court rejected the mother’s argument
that the statute, which included “conduct toward any child of a cruel or
abusive nature” as a ground to terminate parental rights, required proof of
an affirmative act.244 Rather, the Court found “the quantum and obscene
nature of the abuse . . . was so overwhelming that the trial justice could not
ignore the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the information.”245
Specifically, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that “the state is not
239. Id. However, the Court in that case nevertheless excused DFS from case planning
or reunification because it determined that the child suffered unexplained serious physical
injury at the hands of the parents pursuant to §1103 (a)(8). It is important to note that the
parents later voluntarily consented to terminate their parental rights.
240. P.I. v. Dep’t. of Children & Families, 14 So.3d 1173, 1147 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that even a parent who is not present or who does not personally participate in
abuse, but who knowingly fails to protect his or her child from egregious abuse, may have
his or her parental rights terminated). For a pre-ASFA case, see In re M.M., 906 P.2d 675
(Mont. 1995) (interpreting the phrase “allows to be committed sexual abuse or exploitation”
in the statute setting forth termination of parental rights criteria as not requiring actual
knowledge by the parent that acts had been committed on the child).
241. See string citations supra p. 17.
242. See In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772, 773-75 (R.I. 2000).
243. Id. at 775.
244. Id. at 777.
245. Id. at 778.

DISMANTLING THE UNITED FRONT

359

required to prove which parent actually inflicted the abuse” on an infant
with unexplained injuries in a termination of parental rights case.246 The
Court further held that “[a]llowing parents to ignore or stand by while such
abuse and neglect occurs is tantamount to the parents inflicting the abuse
themselves.”247
Similarly, in Nicole B., the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found
parents’ contention that their toddler Nicole had inflicted multiple skull
fractures, brain contusions, fractured ribs, and a broken leg on her twomonth-old sister “incredible, lame and implausible.”248 Until the parents
provided an explanation of the injuries, no treatment could be offered, and
without treatment, the children could not be returned home.249 Since further
treatment would not elicit admissions from the parents, the termination of
parental rights was upheld.250
The Supreme Court of West Virginia has taken a similar stand in cases
where parents are stalwart in their refusal to explain injuries. In State v.
Jessica M., seven-week-old Angela died from blunt force head trauma and
neither parent offered any medically plausible explanation for her death and
other multiple injuries.251 Even after the suicide of father, who was
presumed to be the abuser based on the surviving children’s testimony, the
court would not return them to the mother.252 The court further held that
parental rights can be terminated when clear and convincing evidence
shows an infant suffered extensive physical abuse while in the custody of
his or her parents, and the conditions of the abuse cannot with any
reasonable likelihood be corrected because the perpetrator has not been
identified and the parents have taken no action to identify the abuser.253
Other states are also willing to accept circumstantial evidence as proof
of abuse in unexplained infant injury with two primary caretakers
presenting a united front of denial or ignorance as to the baby's injuries. A
246. Chester J., 754 A.2d at 778.
247. Id.
248. See In re Nichole B., 703 A.2d 612, 615 (R.I. 1997) (holding it was unnecessary
for the Department of Children Youth and Families make ”reasonable efforts” to reunite the
parents with the child).
249. Id. at 618.
250. Id. at 619.
251. See State v. Jessica M., 445 S.E.2d 243, 249 (W.Va. 1994) (“The father argued
that he should be held blameless for his non-action, even though he supported his wife’s
explanation….”).
252. The Court remanded for further fact-finding on other grounds. Id.
253. Id. at 249.
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Nebraska Appeals Court held that a finding of abuse or neglect may be
supported where the record shows both (1) a parent’s control over the child
during the period when the abuse or neglect occurred and (2) multiple
injuries or other serious impairment of health which ordinarily would not
occur. In Chloe L., six-week-old Ethan had 29 fractures throughout his
body in various stages of healing.254 There, the court affirmed the
termination of parental rights of both parents as to both siblings,
notwithstanding that the mother had taken Ethan to the hospital.255 Medical
testimony showed that the injuries were from non-accidental trauma that
would not have happened during the normal handling of an infant and that
could not have been caused by the infant’s toddler sister Chloe, as the
parents suggested.256
Similarly, a Massachusetts Appeals Court terminated parental rights
by clear and convincing evidence for successive injuries to a nonambulatory infant, parents’ changing stories, parents’ failure to appreciate
the nature and seriousness of the injuries, and ruling out of accidental
injury.257
Finally, a New Jersey Appeals Court determined that when a limited
number of parents have access to an infant during a period when abuse
concededly occurs, the burden shifts to those persons to come forward and
provide evidence to establish their non-culpability for that abuse.258 In
A.C., one-month old T.W. sustained a bilateral skull fracture while in the
exclusive care of his mother and neither parent accepted responsibility nor
explained the trauma.259 The A.C. court reasoned that the difficulty of
obtaining direct evidence of parental abuse in closed environments with
victims who have a limited ability to inculpate their abusers justified
shifting the burden to a closed set of caretakers when unexplained injuries
occur.260 The court further concluded that “[t]he abused child's interest is

254. See In re Interest of Chloe L., 712 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest due to neglect because
the parents had committed a felony assault that resulted in serious bodily injury to Ethan).
255. Id. at 292, 298.
256. Id. at 293.
257. See In re Adoption of Nelson, 756 N.E.2d 1227, at 2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)
(unpublished table decision) (affirming the decision that dispensed consent of the father and
mother).
258. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.C., 911 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006) (holding that the child was neglected).
259. Id. at 105, 111.
260. Id. at 111.
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paramount; only when the child can be protected within the family will the
parents' interest in the care and custody of their child also be realized.”261
The common denominator in all of those cases was a seriously injured
child with parents presenting a united front of denial or ignorance.262 None
of those jurisdictions required actual proof or a criminal conviction of the
perpetrator of each child’s horrific injuries.263 Instead, those courts
resolved that it was the parents’ highest duty to keep their child safe.264
Because the child was seriously injured on the parents' watch and the
parents could not explain how the child sustained such deplorable injuries,
these courts terminated parental rights.265
This clause notably focuses on the resultant harm to the child without
identifying a particular perpetrator. While this focus on the child’s injury
rather than parent’s conduct protects children in cases of undetermined
causation, the use of the term “suffered” instead of “subjected to” invites
potentially a different reading of causation in § 1103(a)(8) than in §
1103(a)(7). Therefore, we recommend merging (a)(7) and (a)(8) into one
aggravated circumstances statute that incorporates what acts or omissions
subjected a child to abuse/neglect: 1103(a)(7) Any child has been subjected
to torture, chronic abuse, chronic or severe neglect, sexual abuse, lifethreatening injuries, unexplained serious physical injury, near death or
death. Such language will refocus Delaware’s statute under the ASFA’s
requirement to hold the child’s safety as the paramount concern.266
D. Adding Chronic or Severe Neglect
“Chronic or severe neglect” should also be included under Delaware’s
aggravated circumstances statute given its current omission from the statute
and the difficulty of subsuming chronic or severe neglect into the currently
listed categories. Adding “chronic or severe neglect” will have clear
advantages to protect children in dangerous situations. Although “chronic
or severe neglect” would be a legal finding under the statute, a pediatric
child abuse expert may make a medical finding of “chronic neglect.”
Crossing over from a medical finding to a legal finding is a much more
261. Id. at 109.
262. See string citations supra p. 24.
263. See, e.g., In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772 (R.I. 2000).
264. See, e.g., New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.C., 911 A.2d 104 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006).
265. See e.g.,id.; see, e.g., State v. Jessica M., 445 S.E.2d 243 (W. Va 1994).
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2010).
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streamlined conclusion than, say, arguing for a finding of “torture” which is
left undefined. Because there have been no published Delaware court
decisions concluding a parent either directly tortured a child or tortured a
child by failing to act or purposely depriving the child of basic necessities,
expanding the statute to include chronic or severe neglect will help capture
such horrific cases.
For example, recently in Delaware, a twelve year-old child came into
care following three months of isolation in his room, food deprivation, and
other significant maltreatment.267 He was hospitalized with malnutrition
and had some significant bruising all over his body. While the physical
injuries and malnourishment may or may not constitute torture, such
treatment by the parent would likely constitute chronic or severe neglect.
However, without adding “chronic or severe neglect” to (a)(7), such a child
welfare case may not be covered by the existing statute since the injuries
have a clear explanation by a verbal child and there may be no findings of
torture or chronic abuse depending on the facts available in the civil
proceeding.268 Equally, the term torture is so politically charged that some
judges may avoid making such a finding.269 In addition, “torture” is not a
medical finding, but chronic neglect is. Therefore, enhancing the statute
with the term “chronic or severe neglect” would enable DFS to deny case
planning with parents in such cases of horrific child maltreatment and move
toward termination of parental rights. It would also likely capture extreme
cases of failure to thrive due to chronic abuse or neglect,270 long-term
267. Police: Boy Locked in Room 3 Months: Couple Charged, 2012 WLNR 25484760
(Wilmington, De) (Nov. 30, 2012); see also Michael Walsh, Delaware boy, 12, escapes after
parents locked him in room for 3 months without regular food or medical care: police,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/parents-locked-boy-12NYDAILYNEWS.COM,
room-3-months-article-1.1295254 (Mar. 21, 2013).
268. In that case, because criminal charges were pending, some witnesses were
prevented from testifying in order to avoid compromising the criminal investigation.
269. Just as “unexplained” may represent a legal conclusion, or lack of legal
conclusion, in the context of serious injurious, “torture” has also taken on the tone of a legal
conclusion that may discourage judges from making a finding based on facts alone.
270. See Jacks v. Div. of Family Servs. & Office of the Child Advocate, 974 A.2d 100
(Del. 2009). Jacks’ three children were removed after continuous reports of neglect and
possible abuse. Id. at 104. One child was hospitalized due to weight loss and to determine
the cause of her failure to thrive. Id. at 102. Once hospitalized, the child steadily gained
weight for eight days, suggesting to the pediatrician that the child was underfed, not failure
to thrive. Id. Once placed in foster care, all three children – previously diagnosed as
failuring to thrive – rapidly gained weight and improved developmentally. Id. From 20002008, the children were twice removed from their mother’s home, placed in foster care,
returned to relatives, given back to their mother by those relatives, and removed again by
DFS. Id.at 104. Each time the children returned to their mother’s care, they lost weight and
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deprivation, and maltreatment. Additionally, it would likely pass
constitutional muster as an aggravated circumstance because South
Dakota,271 Montana,272 and Maryland273 protect children based on chronic
or severe neglect.
E. Anticipating Unintended Consequences
As with any statute, greater complexity and/or enumeration of factors
for consideration may lead to unintended consequences. Any revisions to
these grounds for terminating parental rights must consider existing case
law on parents’ due process rights, the institutional and administrative
capacities of the court system and the Division of Family Services, and
children’s best interests in permanent, appropriate placements.
In the interest of simplicity and clarity, the recommended proposed
statutory changes to include:
DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1101
Definition: “Subjected,” which should be defined to include: “has
exposed, caused, enabled, allowed or permitted.” With such a
definition, the proposed statutory changes would appear as follows:
DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103(a)(7) should read:
(7) Any child has been subjected to torture, chronic abuse, chronic
neglect, sexual abuse, life-threatening injuries, unexplained serious
physical injury, near death or death.

VII. Conclusion
Most states struggle with both statutory and judicial definitions of
aggravated circumstances, especially in the context of serious bodily injury,
torture cases, and the requirement of reasonable reunification efforts. While
missed school. Upon return to foster care, they gained seven to twelve pounds. Id. During
these eight years, the children were not only repeatedly underfed, abused, and neglected, but
also deprived of permanency. Id. at 105. Jacks’ parental rights were not terminated until
2008 and her appeal was not settled (upholding termination of parental rights) until May
2009. Id. at 107. A different statute may have enabled greater safety and permanency for
these children much earlier in their young lives, as opposed to being left to “twist in the
wind.” See supra note 132.
271. S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 268A 21.1 (West 2012).
272. In re M.N., 362 Mont. 186, 261 P3d 1047 (Mont. 2011).
273. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §3-812b (West 2012).
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ASFA theoretically has provided a national framework for handling such
cases, states diverge widely in their adoption and enforcement of those
federal provisions.
Matt, Jill, Kate, and countless other cases of seriously physically
abused children underscore the need for Delaware to place greater emphasis
on child welfare protections when two parent caregivers provide no
plausible explanation for serious physical injuries and less on who actually
inflicted the injuries. An over-reliance on proving causation of a child’s
injuries is detrimental to both children and the court system charged with
protecting the child’s best interest. Consequently, the civil system must
address child protection without necessarily waiting for criminal
prosecution or proof as to which caregiver injured the child.
There are clear advantages to bolstering protections for abused and
neglected children in the civil system when serious unexplained injury
cases are concerned.274 The burden of proof is less stringent in the civil
system: clear and convincing evidence is the standard under a termination
of parental rights proceeding, whereas beyond a reasonable doubt is the
legal standard in a criminal case. The effects are longer lasting: a
termination of parental rights will likely last for the child’s minority,
whereas in the criminal system, sentencing, parole, and probation all factor
into when parents can have contact with their children again. Criminal
proceedings are punitive, whereas civil child welfare proceedings address
the best interest of the child.275 While the criminal system can drag out
court dates based on a variety of factors, child welfare cases must move
more rapidly to ensure the best interest of children to achieve permanency
within twelve to fifteen months of entering care.276
Delaware’s child welfare system would have an enhanced capacity to
protect children’s best interests in cases of unexplained serious abuse
involving two parent caregivers acting as a united front given the
appropriate statutory reform, precedent-setting case litigation, and childfocused advocacy.

274. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (affirming that defendant is liable for
the whole damage whether they are acting in concert or independently).
275. See In re H.J., 854 P.2d 381, 383 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993) (holding that it is in best
interests of the children to terminate the parents’ rights).
276. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103 (a)(5) (2009).

